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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. 
KORY SULLIVAN, : Case No. 20050978-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West2004). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion in limiting cross-examination of 
Phyllis Khoury and Ian Walston, where questions were irrelevant or cumulative of questions 
already asked and answered? 
"Trial courts have 'broad discretion in restricting the scope of cross-examination, and 
on appeal the trial court's ruling' regarding the scope of cross-examination cis reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard.'" State v. Valdez, 2006 UT App 290, \ 7 (quoting with 
modification Statev. Gomez,2002XJT 120, Tf 12,63 P.3d 72). Accord State v. Tarrats,2005 
UT 50, U 16, 122 P.3d 581. An appellate court "will not reverse the trial court's ruling on 
evidentiary issues unless it is manifest that the trial court so abused its discretion that there 
is a likelihood that injustice resulted." Valdez, 2006 UT App 290, f^ 7 (internal quotation 
marks and citation deleted. Accord Tarrats, 2005 UT 50, U 16 (citing Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 
1112). 
2. Is defendant's claim that exculpatory evidence was withheld preserved? 
Alternatively, does the claim—that an alleged photograph depicting a shoe print on the 
victim's face was withheld—have a factual basis where the prosecutor disclaimed any 
knowledge of such a photograph; none of the photographs admitted into evidence depicted 
a shoe print on the victim's face; the police found no evidence to substantiate that the victim 
was kicked; and no trial witness, including the victim, testified that he was kicked? 
Following the prosecutor's explanation, defendant waived this claim (R213: 42-43). 
Alternatively, the record provides no factual basis for it. In either case, the trial court did not 
rule on the issue and no standard of review applies. 
3. Can defendant establish prejudicial error based on the trial court's refusal to 
remove two prospective jurors for cause, where defendant ultimately struck the challenged 
jurors and the seated jury was impartial? 
"To prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to remove a juror for cause, a 
defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of the jury was partial or 
incompetent." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,398 (Utah 1994). Consequently, a defendant 
waives any claim of error by exercising peremptory challenges to remove the challenged 
jurors and achieve an impartial jury. State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 505-507 (Utah 1997). 
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Because defendant used his peremptories and the seated jury was impartial, the issue is 
waived and no standard of review applies. 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, which is defined in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) (West 
2004), assault is defined as: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
. . . or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence that causes bodily injury 
to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
"Serious bodily injury" is "bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, 
or creates a substantial risk of death." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (West 2004). 
Any other determinative statute, rule, or constitutional provision cited in the argument 
is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 6, 2003, defendant was charged with aggravated assault, a second degree 
felony, and interference with a peace officer making an arrest, a class B misdemeanor (R. 2-
4). At the subsequent preliminary hearing, the prosecutor dismissed the interference charge 
and the magistrate bound defendant over on aggravated assault (R. 42-44). 
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One week before trial, defendant filed numerous requests for discovery and other 
pretrial motions (R. 102-120). The prosecution complied with the discovery requests, but 
objected to other of defendant's pretrial motions (R. 124-134). On the morning of trial, 
defendant complained that the prosecutor had not provided him with an alleged exculpatory 
photograph, which defendant speculated depicted a shoe print on the victim's face, and 
which might establish that someone else caused the victim's injuries (R213: 42-43). The 
prosecutor explained that she had provided defendant with all photographs of the victim, that 
none of the photographs known to her depicted a shoe print on the victim's face, that the 
police had been unable to substantiate that the victim was kicked, and that no prosecution 
witness, including the victim, would testify that the victim had been kicked (id.). Once this 
explanation was given, defendant did not further pursue the matter (R213: 43). 
On January 11, 2005, a one-day jury trial was conducted (R. 191-93). The jury 
convicted defendant as charged (R. 161-62). On September 26, 2005, defendant was 
sentenced to the statutory term of one-to-15 years imprisonment. Execution of the prison 
term was suspended and defendant placed on 36 months probation upon condition that he 
serve 180 days in jail, pay a $2000.00 fine, pay restitution as determined, and comply with 
other terms of probation (R. 191-92). On October 20,2005, he timely appealed (R. 196-98).l 
*In his Statement of the Case, defendant extensively discusses the trial court's 
refusal to continue the trial for a second time, the fact that a videotape of the victim's 
sister (who did not testify) was sent to the wrong address, and his counsel's biblical 
references in closing argument. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 5-8 & 12-13. See 
also R213: 44-46, 165-76. Defendant, however, claims no error in connection with these 
matters. See Br.Aplt. at 15-26. 
4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On St. Patrick's Day, 2003, Ian Walston went to Dimitri's Social Club to celebrate 
a friend's birthday with his sister and other friends (R213: 108). Two hours later, Ian lay 
sprawled on the floor of the club, unconscious and bleeding from a broken nose and thrice-
broken jaw (R213: 114-121). 
The night started simply enough. Ian, his sister, and friends met at Dimitri's to 
celebrate a friend's birthday (R218:108). The crowd was a little larger than normal because 
it was St. Patrick's Day, but no problems occurred until near closing when several customers 
approached Phyllis Khoury, the club's manager, and complained that three customers were 
being "verbally abusive and offensive" (R213: 55-56). 
Phyllis walked towards the three to ask them to leave (R213: 56). The group was 
about 25 feet from her, but she could see them clearly and quickly realized they were the 
Sullivan brothers, Matthew, Brian, and defendant Kory, who were regular patrons of the club 
(R213: 58). The brothers, who were large and exceptionally muscled, like body builders, 
were pushing and shoving each other (R213: 57, 83, 93). Other customers were either 
attempting to walk around them or to avoid them by walking in a different direction (R213: 
61). 
As Phyllis reached the group, but before she could say anything to the Sullivans, 
defendant pushed Brian "just a little too hard" (R213: 57). Brian fell into Ian Walston, who 
was attempting to walk around the brothers and leave the club (R213: 57, 62,110). Ian did 
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not know the Sullivans and had not spoken to any of them that night (R213: 125, 131, 138-
39). Ian shoved Brian back (R213: 62-63, 87, 110, 136). 
Someone suddenly hit Ian in the face (R213: 62).2 Ian saw white lights for a moment, 
but did not fall down, lose consciousness, or bleed (R213: 111). Matt Sullivan then slapped 
Ian in the face, with his fingers landing in Ian's mouth (R213: 111-112, 137). A bouncer 
grabbed Matt and held him back (R213: 112). Ian asked Brian, "What did I do to you? 
What's going on? I'm not part of this." (R213: 110). Matt yelled at Ian, "I'm going to kill 
you"(R213: 113). 
Ian backed up several feet, away from the Sullivans, and behind some tables around 
the dance floor (R213: 89, 113). He momentarily lifted a chair about two inches off the 
floor, but immediately put it back down when other customers yelled, "No, no" (R213: 89-
90, 94-98, 102).3 
Phyllis was still near the Sullivans. Defendant was next to her and Ian was about four 
feet in front (R213: R213: 63). Debbie Dixon, a customer who did not know Ian and had just 
2This person was not identified at trial, other than it was not defendant (R213: 
in). 
3Defendant states that Ian "lifted the chair in an aggressive manner," based on the 
fact that other customers yelled, "No, no." See Br.Aplt. at 11. This ignores Debbie 
Dixon's testimony, who was the only trial witness to see Ian pick up the chair. She 
insisted that Ian did not threaten defendant with it. According to Debbie, it was just a 
"gesture. He never got it off the ground" (R213: 95). Debbie denied that Ian acted as if 
he were throwing it; she testified, "It was almost like he was trying to get behind it, not 
throw it" (R213: 96). She explained, "[Ian] was trying to get as far away from them [the 
Sullivans] as possible. There was a table in between them" (R213: 102). Moreover, 15 
feet separated Ian from the Sullivan brothers (R213: 101). 
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met defendant that night, was about seven feet from defendant (R213: 90, 99-100). Despite 
their different locations, both women could clearly see what happened next (R213: 63-64, 
90). 
Phyllis felt herself being shoved out of the way. She turned and saw defendant reach 
over her shoulder with "a flying punch" directed at Ian (R213: 57, 63-64). Debbie also saw 
defendant suddenly advance on Ian (R213: 89-90). Both women testified that Ian did 
nothing to provoke defendant and was obviously trying to avoid him (R213: 57-58, 64, 88-
90). From her angle, Debbie saw defendant "cock[] back [his hand] and just crunch[]" Ian 
with a punch (R213: 89-90). The punch hit Ian on the jaw and instantly knocked him "out 
cold" (R213: 64, 89-90). Ian's unconscious body flew over two tables, bounced, and landed 
on the floor (R213: 64,90). Phyllis ran to call the paramedics (R213: 64). Debbie ran to Ian 
(R213: 89-90). 
Ian's "mouth was slightly open and blood was coming out of his mouth. His eyes 
were rolling in the back of his head" (R213: 90-91). He was not moving and Debbie 
wondered if he were dead, until the table he landed under was pushed back and she saw he 
was breathing (R213:91). Ian came to a moment later, curled up in a ball, and cried in pain 
(id.). Debbie stayed with him until the paramedics arrived (id.). 
Ian could only remember being slapped and backing up (R213: 110, 113-115). He 
woke up in a daze in the ambulance on the way to the hospital (R213: 114-115). He was 
losing a lot of blood and floating in and out of consciousness (id.). His face felt like it had 
been run over by a trunk (id.). At the hospital, he was treated for his concussion and broken 
7 
nose (R213: 115-124). His jaw, however, was broken in three places and required surgery 
(id.). Plates and screws were used to reconnect his jaw, but this resulted in his bite being 
permanently off (id.). Ian's mouth was wired shut for months, which required him to sip 
only liquids via a syringe for nourishment (id.). After the wires were removed, he was still 
forced to eat only pureed food for a substantial period (id.). None of his teeth were broken, 
but several of his teeth were loose (id.). By the time of trial, almost two years after the 
assault, Ian still experienced substantial problems. His bite remained off, chewing was 
difficult on the right side of his mouth, and he had "TMJ" which caused him discomfort and 
pain (id.). He also had neck pain, occasional dizziness, and frequent headaches (id.). He 
never fully recovered his memory and had problems focusing mentally (id.). He testified that 
he "was overwhelmed with medical expenses" and could not afford to undergo further 
treatment for his TMJ (R213: 122-23). He had retained a civil attorney, Steven B. Smith, 
who accompanied him to court (R213: 142). 
Defendant did not testify or present any witnesses (R213: 148). His attorney argued 
that once Ian picked up the chair, it was not reasonable to think that defendant and his 
brothers would "turn their back and walk out of that bar with their back to" Ian (R213:176). 
He also claimed that others had hit Ian besides defendant and that there was no medical 
evidence that defendant's punch caused Ian's injuries (R213: 173). In sum, the defense was 
that defendant was guilty of simple assault, not aggravated assault (R213: 52). The jury 
disagreed and convicted defendant of aggravated assault (R. 161-162). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Cross-Examination Regarding Civil Suit Contrary to defendant's assertions, the 
trial court never barred defendant him from exploring Phyllis Khoury's possible bias in 
connection with a civil suit filed by Ian Walston against defendant and Dimitri's Social Club, 
or from questioning her credibility by impeaching her trial testimony with evidence of 
inconsistent prior statements. The trial court only prohibited defendant from asking her the 
same question four times and from asking her a hypothetical question about the suit after she 
repeatedly denied knowing anything about it. 
Similarly, defendant was never barred from exploring Ian Walston's potential bias or 
inconsistencies. The court only ruled irrelevant a question of whether Ian's civil attorney 
told him defense counsel wanted to speak to him. The court also ruled that continued 
questions about the allegations contained in the suit were cumulative because the substance 
of those same allegations had already been extensively inquired into on direct and cross-
examination. 
The trial court's evidentiary rulings were correct and fell well within its discretion to 
bar irrelevant and cumulative testimony. But even if, arguendo, any error occurred, it was 
not prejudicial. The jury was well aware of defendant's claim that a civil suit had been filed, 
knew that Phyllis Khoury and Dimitri's were responsible for the safety of their customers on 
the night of the assault, and could easily deduce any hostility the victim might harbor against 
defendant, who had caused him to undergo surgery, months of intense recovery, years of 
pain, and "overwhelming" financial burdens. Additionally, the jury was fully aware that Ian 
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and the state witnesses insisted that the assault was unprovoked; that Ian did not remember, 
but did not deny, picking up a chair; and that Ian originally thought he had been kicked 
because a nurse had told him his face looked like it had. Consequently, further cross-
examination on these topics was merely cumulative of other evidence. Even if the questions 
had been permitted, the answers would not have changed the outcome of trial. 
Alleged Exculpatory Evidence. Defendant alleges that the prosecutor improperly 
withheld a photograph depicting a shoe print on the victim's face. Defendant claims that the 
photograph was exculpatory because it might have established that someone other than 
defendant caused the victim's substantial injuries. However, when this issue was initially 
raised on the morning of trial, the prosecutor explained that she had no knowledge or 
possession of such a photograph, that the police investigated but found no evidence that the 
victim was kicked, and that no witness, including the victim, would testify that he was 
kicked. After this explanation, defense counsel dropped the issue. Consequently, it is 
waived. Even if the issue were preserved, there is no factual basis to support defendant's 
claim that such a photograph existed. 
For-Cause Challenge to Prospective Jurors. Defendant claims that reversible error 
occurred when the trial court failed to remove two prospective jurors for cause because he 
was forced to use two of his four peremptory strikes to remove them. At the same time, 
defendant acknowledges that because the challenged jurors were removed, the seated jury 
was impartial. Nevertheless, defendant claims this Court should ignore Utah's well-
established cure-or-waive rule and reverse under the cumulative error doctrine. 
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The cumulative error doctrine is not a preservation doctrine and, consequently, cannot 
supersede Utah's cure-or-waive rule. Moreover, the cumulative error doctrine applies only 
when multiple substantial errors are found. In this case, defendant has not established any 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN 
LIMITING CROSS-EXAMINATION WHERE THE QUESTIONS 
ASKED WERE IRRELEVANT OR CUMULATIVE 
Defendant claims that the trial court wholly barred him from cross-examining Phyllis 
Khoury and Ian Walston concerning an alleged civil suit filed by Ian against defendant and 
Dimitri's Social Club.4 See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 17. According to defendant, the 
trial court's evidentiary rulings prevented him from exploring the witnesses' alleged biases 
and prior inconsistent statements. See id. at 15-19. Defendant asserts that the court's 
4The record contains no evidence that Ian Walston actually filed a civil complaint 
or that the complaint was served on any party. After the case was submitted to the jury, 
defense counsel made a record concerning the suit (R213: 180-82). See Addendum B. He 
represented that a complaint entitled Ian Walston v. Kory Sullivan, Matthew Sullivan, 
Dimitri's, etc. was filed and that he had a certified copy which he asked to be 
incorporated into the record (R213: 180). The prosecutor responded that while she knew 
Ian had a civil attorney and had heard "rumors" of a civil suit, she knew nothing about it 
(R213: 186). The record on appeal does not contain a copy of the complaint. 
Nevertheless, the State does not dispute that the victim filed or contemplated the filing of 
a civil suit against defendant and the club as this accords with the fair inferences to be 
drawn from the record. 
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unreasonable restriction on his cross-examination prejudiced the outcome of his trial. See 
id.. Defendant's claims are without merit. 
"The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses."5 State v. Valdez, 2006 UT App 290, \ 8. "'Cross-
examination is the principal means by which the believabiHty of a witness and the truth of 
his testimony are tested/" Id. (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974)). "'[A] 
criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was 
prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a 
prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts 
from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the 
witness.5" Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227,483 (1988) (quotingDelaware v. VanArsdall, 
475 U.S. 673,680(1986)). 
Cross-examination, however, is not "wholly unrestrained." Valdez, 2006 UT App 
290, \ 9. "Trial courts have cbroad discretion in restricting the scope of cross-examination, 
and on appeal, the trial court's ruling regarding the scope of cross-examination is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard.'"/</. at^ f 7 (quoting with modification State v. Gomez, 
2002 UT 120, Tf 12). Accord State v. Tarrats, 2005 UT 50, f 16, 122 P.3d 581. "Likewise, 
'trial courts have wide discretion in determining relevance, probative value, and prejudice.'" 
Id. An appellant court "'will not reverse the trial court's ruling on evidentiary issues unless 
defendant's nominal citation to the Utah constitution precludes consideration of 
any independent state constitutional argument. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 
1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988). 
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it is manifest that the trial court so abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice 
resulted.'" Valdez, 2006 UT App 290, f 7. Accord Tarrats, 2005 UT 50, f 16 (citing Gomez, 
2002 UT 120,^12). 
Whether a witness is a party to civil litigation arising out of the same circumstances 
of a criminal prosecution is generally considered relevant to showing potential bias. See 
Utah R. Evid. 608(c) (recognizing general relevancy of evidence demonstrating witness bias) 
(Add. A). See also VanArsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-680 (recognizing general relevance of bias 
testimony); State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 499-500 (Utah 1986) (same). But even when 
evidence is relevant, it may be excluded if its admission would otherwise create a danger of 
unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or result in "undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403 {Add. A). See also 
Tarrrats, 2005 UT 50,Tflf 36-41 (recognizing that rule 403 limits admissibility of otherwise 
relevant evidence); State v. Williams, 111 P.2d 1368, 1369-1370 (Utah 1989) (same); 
Valdez, 2006 UT App 290, \ 14 (recognizing limitations placed on rule 608 by rule 403). 
See also Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837, 844-847 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing and 
recognizing reasonable limitations placed on questions designed to show bias), cert, denied, 
532 U.S. 1024 (2001); State v. Reis, 636 A.2d 872, 874-875 (Conn. App.) (same in context 
of evidence of civil suit), cert, denied, 640 A.2d 1118 (Conn. 1994); People v. Doran, 628 
N.E.2d 260, 263-264 (111. App. 1993) (same). 
In this case, the trial court properly exercised its discretion to exclude questions 
tangentially related to Ian Walston's civil suit because the questions were irrelevant or 
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cumulative of other evidence. But even if arguendo any error occurred, no prejudice 
resulted. The excluded questions were posed only to Phyllis Khoury and Ian Walston, whose 
other testimony substantively covered the same topics and provided an adequate basis to infer 
any bias. Moreover, the jury had more than adequate evidence to convict defendant based 
solely on Debbie Dixon's testimony, who had no connection with Dimitri's or Ian Walston 
and, therefore, had no possible bias arising from any civil suit between them. 
A. Excluded Questions Posed to Phyllis Khoury. 
Phyllis Khoury was the manager in charge of Dimitri's in March 2003 and responsible 
for ensuring the safety of the customers on the night of the assault (R213: 74). She denied 
being fired from Dimitri's, but explained that she left months after the assault to work at 
Club Palms and, in late Fall 2004, was hired as the manager of Murray Grill & Theater 
(R213: 54). She also testified that she was an eyewitness to defendant's assault on Ian 
Walston. See Statement of Facts, supra. On cross-examination, she was throughly 
examined concerning any discrepancies between her trial testimony, preliminary hearing 
testimony, and statements to the police (R213: 65-76, 78). She was also questioned about 
her relationship with defendant and his brothers (id.). 
Towards the close of cross-examination, defense counsel asked Phyllis about a civil 
suit purportedly filed by the victim against her "employer" and/or Dimitri's. Three times, 
defense counsel asked Phyllis if she knew about the civil suit; three times she replied that she 
did not (R213: 75-77). See Add. B. Counsel then asked her if she knew if her "employer 
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"was included in the suit and the prosecutor objected that the question had been asked and 
answered (id.). The trial court sustained the objection (id.).6 
Defense counsel next asked Phyllis if she had been contacted by a civil attorney to 
give a deposition concerning the assault; she replied that she had not (id.). Counsel twice 
again asked her if she was claiming that she knew nothing about the suit and she again 
affirmed that this was true (id.). 
Despite her prior disclaimers, defense counsel asked her to hypothetically assume that 
a civil suit had been filed; the prosecutor objected to the question as outside the scope of 
direct examination and irrelevant (id.). The trial court ruled it irrelevant (R213: 76, 188). 
Defense counsel then re-framed the question and, without objection, asked Phyllis if she 
agreed that it was logical to presume that she would be a witness in "any litigation that has 
to do with this case" (R213: 76). Phyllis agreed (id.). With that, defense counsel ended his 
cross-examination (id.). 
While defendant asserts that the court's two rulings prevented him from establishing 
that Phyllis Khoury "had changed her testimony to better insulate herself and Dimitri's from 
civil liability" and left the jury "with the impression that no civil suit was filed," see Br.Aplt. 
at 15-16 & 19, he does not explain how. Nor does he place the objections in context or 
compare the excluded evidence with evidence that was otherwise admitted. Moreover, he 
does not acknowledge his own ability to present evidence apart from cross-examination by 
6Defense counsel's question was also objectionable because it assumed a fact not 
in evidence—that Phyllis was still employed by Dimitri's—even though she had testified 
that she left Dimitri's and was now working for a different establishment. 
15 
establishing that Phyllis was served with the suit or producing witnesses who would verify 
that she knew of the suit. Defendant's conclusory assertions and his failure to properly 
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's rulings justify summary rejection of his 
argument.7 See Demetropoulos v. Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah App. 1988) 
(recognizing that an appellant fails to adequately brief an issue when he does not explain 
"why, under applicable authorities, those errors are material ones necessitating reversal or 
other relief); Utah R. Grim. P. 24(a)(9) (directing that Utah appellate courts not consider the 
merits of issues when the underlying facts are not marshaled or when legal analysis is 
lacking). See also United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 
2006 UT 35, ffl[ 24-27, 553 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (reaffirming the heavy burden placed on an 
appellant to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's rulings or bear the "grim 
consequences" of summary affirmance on appeal). 
7Additionally, it is questionable whether defendant preserved the bias issue now 
raised in connection with Phyllis Khoury. When the court sustained the objections during 
the cross-examination of Phyllis, defense counsel did not respond (R213: 75-76). Later, 
after the jury was in deliberation, defense counsel asked to make a record regarding 
objections to his questioning of Ian Walston and cited to Olden, 488 U.S. 227, a bias 
case (R213: 179-180). He then discussed the objections raised in connection with Phyllis, 
but stated only that if the prosecutor were aware that Phyllis was lying, it would amount 
to prosecutorial misconduct (R213: 181-182). On appeal, defendant abandons his 
misconduct claim and now raises the same argument as to both witnesses. See Br.Aplt. at 
2-3 & 15-19. But see State v. Workman, 2006 UT 116,115 n.2, 133 P.3d453 
(recognizing that an issue is preserved only when it is "presented to the trial court in such 
a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue") (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). Consequently, the bias issue is waived as to Phyllis. 
Alternatively, the State addresses the merits. 
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Alternatively, if the merits are considered, the trial court properly limited cross-
examination. And even if any error occurred, it was not prejudicial. 
Prior to the challenged questions being asked, defense counsel informed the jury of 
the civil suit during his opening statement. He told the jury that the victim filed suit against 
Dimitri's and that "Ms. Khoury in this case, of course, is also by implication included in that 
lawsuit, and testifying for the owners of the club" (R213: 51). When Phyllis Khoury later 
testified, she explained that while she had been the manager and responsible for customer 
safety on the night in question, she no longer worked for Dimitri's, and had not worked for 
them since May 2004 (R213: 54). She further testified that in her opinion, security was 
sufficient on the night in question and that defendant attacked Ian without provocation 
(R213:74-75). Moreover, she explained that defendant and his brothers were regulars at the 
club during the time she worked there and that one of the brothers had also worked at the 
club (R213: 58, 66). She expressed no ill will towards defendant or his brothers, apart from 
her observations of the assault, and did not know Ian. Phyllis also admitted that even though 
she was unaware that a civil suit was filed, it was logical to assume that she would be a 
witness in any litigation involving the assault (R213: 76). In sum, the jury had an fair and 
I 
adequate basis forjudging any self-interest or bias Phyllis might harbor in testifying. See 
Quinn, 234 F.3d at 844-847 (recognizing that there are multiple ways of attacking a 
witness's credibility and bias). 
Additionally, none of the excluded questions limited defendant's ability to cross-
examine Phyllis concerning any discrepancies between her trial testimony, preliminary 
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hearing testimony, and statements to the police. Indeed, defendant extensively questioned 
her on those discrepancies (R213: 65-78). And even if defendant had proof that Phyllis was 
lying about the suit, exclusion of a hypothetical question did not affect defendant's ability 
to introduce this other evidence via another witness or through proof of service. 
Finally, Phyllis did not observe as much of the incident as Debbie Dixon. Thus, even 
if even the excluded questions had been asked and answered, other evidence fully supported 
defendant's conviction. Debbie's testimony is particularly strong because she was not 
employed by Dimitri's, did not know the victim, and had only just met defendant. See 
Statement of Facts, supra. Nor did defendant testify or present witnesses to refute Debbie's 
eyewitness account of the assault. As such, there is no likelihood that the jury would not 
have convicted defendant based on Debbie's testimony, even if they had found Phyllis to be 
biased or inconsistent. See Rammel, 721 P.2d at 499-500; State v. Liuafi, 623 P. 2d 1271, 
1275-1278 (Hawaii App. 1981); State v. Creel, 508 So.2d 859, 863 (La. App. 1987) (all 
finding any error in excluding evidence of civil suit harmless in light of other evidence to 
support conviction), cert, denied, 532 So.2d 171 (La. 1985). 
In sum, the two objections were properly sustained. But even if any error occurred, 
no prejudice resulted. The jury was fully informed of any potential bias Phyllis might harbor 
and any discrepancies in her testimony. Moreover, her testimony was not critical given 
Debbie's testimony. Consequently, in this case, it is not "manifest that the trial court so 
abused its discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted." See Valdez, 2006 UT 
App 290,1f7. 
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B. Excluded Question Posed to Ian Walston. 
For essentially the same reasons, no error occurred when the trial court sustained one 
objection to a question posed to Ian Walston as irrelevant and curtailed other questions 
concerning the allegations in the civil suit, which questions had already been asked and 
answered.8 
As previously stated, defense counsel told the jury in opening that Ian Walston, the 
victim, filed a civil suit against defendant and Dimitri's (R213: 51-52). He told the jury that 
it would be "interesting" to see if Ian admitted that he was drunk, and not just buzzed, 
because this could hurt his civil suit {id). 
Ian Walston was the last witness to testify for the prosecution. Ian admitted that he 
had been drinking on the night of the assault and felt "buzzed," which he clarified meant he 
was a "little light-headed" and was "starting to feel the alcohol hit" (R213: 109,129-131). 
He admitted that the police report reflected that he said he was intoxicated, but insisted that 
he only told the police that he was "buzzed" (R213: 131, 145-47).9 
Ian explained that he did not speak to defendant or his brothers except when he was 
shoved by Brian. See Statement of Facts, supra. He testified that defendant did not initially 
8Again, defendant has failed to marshal the facts supporting the court's evidentiary 
rulings regarding the examination of Ian Walston. He has not placed the rulings in 
context or compared the excluded evidence to the testimony presented. Additionally, his 
legal analysis is conclusory and does not explain why the court's rulings unduly limited 
his ability to impeach Ian or show bias. Seefn. 7, supra. Though the State maintains that 
the his defendant's claim should not be considered, it alternatively addresses it. 
9Defendant never explained why whether Ian was buzzed or intoxicated made any 
difference, especially where no witness testified that Ian provoked the assault. 
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hit or slap him and that due to the memory loss caused by the injury, he could not remember 
who punched him in the jaw. See id. Indeed, he attributed no culpability to defendant 
because he simply could not remember what happened following the initial hit and slap. See 
id. While Ian testified to his extensive injuries, photographs were also admitted into 
evidence which independently demonstrated his swollen face and wired-shut mouth. See 
Exhibits 1-4. 
Ian described the pain and suffering he continued to suffer two years after the assault. 
He explained that in addition to pain in his jaw, he suffered headaches, dizziness, neck pain, 
and memory problems (R213: 122-124). He was "overwhelmed" with medical costs from 
the assault and could not afford necessary additional treatment for his dislocated jar (R213: 
122-23). He admitted that he had hired a civil attorney and that the attorney had 
accompanied him to court in Matthew's criminal case and now in defendant's case (R213: 
139-142). 
Taken as a whole, these facts provided the jury with a fair and adequate basis to judge 
any self-interest or undue bias Ian might harbor in testifying. Consequently, in the context 
of this case, the court properly ruled that the question of whether Ian's civil attorney had told 
Ian that defense counsel wanted to speak to him was irrelevant. And even if relevant, its 
exclusion was not prejudicial where other more relevant facts concerning Ian's potential for 
bias had been elicited. See cases cited supra at 13. 
Apart from bias, defendant also claims that the court ruled that he could not question 
Ian about the allegations in the suit, specifically, "that [Ian] was kicked repeatedly, that [the 
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assault] was unprovoked and that he did nothing" (R213: 180). Defendant's assertion is 
incorrect. The court ruled only that the substance of these questions had been asked and 
answered and any additional questions would be cumulative (R213: 188). See Add. B. The 
ruling was correct. 
During his testimony, Ian testified that he did nothing to provoke defendant (R213: 
111, 125, 131, 138-139). This was substantiated by Phyllis and Debbie. See Statement of 
Facts, supra. He also explained that he initially thought he had been kicked because a nurse 
told him his face looked like it had been (R213: 132-33, 139). Ian said he never saw the 
mark the nurse was referring to and had no personal knowledge that he was kicked (id.). 
Phyllis and Debbie never testified that anyone kicked Ian. The photographs of the victim 
introduced into evidence also did not depict a shoe print on Ian's face. See Exhibits 1-4. 
Thus, any further questioning concerning why Ian initially alleged he had been kicked or 
whether he provoked the attack would have been redundant and cumulative of this evidence. 
Consequently, further questioning was properly curtailed. See Utah R. Evid. 403. See also 
cases cited supra at 13. 
Finally, Ian could not remember as much about the incident as Phyllis Khoury or 
Debbie Dixon could. Thus, even if even the excluded questions, had been asked and 
answered, the answers would not have negated the validity of defendant's conviction. Both 
women testified that no one kicked Ian and that Ian did not provoke the attack. See 
Statement of Facts, supra. Furthermore, given the uncontradicted evidence that defendant 
punched Ian in the jaw, which caused Ian serious bodily injury, there is ample evidence to 
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support the verdict even if the jury viewed Ian as biased or inconsistent in his answers. As 
such, there is no likelihood of injustice in defendant's conviction. See Valdez, 2006 UT App 
290, Tf 7. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE HIS CLAIM THAT 
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE WAS WITHHELD; ALTERNATIVELY, 
THERE IS NO FACTUAL BASIS TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM 
Defendant claims that the prosecutor failed to comply with defendant's discovery 
request for a photograph of the victim depicting a shoe print on his face. See Br.Aplt. at 19-
23. According to defendant, the photograph was exculpatory because it might establish that 
someone other than defendant, who only punched Ian, was responsible for the injuries. See 
id. Defendant argues that the prosecutor5 s suppression of this exculpatory evidence violates 
due process and entitles him to a new trial. See id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963)). 
Defendant is correct that a prosecutor has a duty to produce exculpatory evidence and 
that evidence which could reduce the degree of the crime is exculpatory. However, he is 
mistaken that any Brady violation occurred here. 
" In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court 
in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.'55 Workman, 2006 
UT 1164 15 n.2 (quoting 438 Main St v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, If 51, 99 P.3d 801) 
(other internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "To allow the trial judge the 
opportunity to rule on a particular issue, '(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) 
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the issue must be specifically raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority.5" Id. (quoting 438 Main St., 2004 UT 72,151) (other 
internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, defendant initially raised the issue, but 
then wholly abandoned it before obtaining a ruling on it (R213: 42-43). See Addendum C. 
Consequently, this Court should not address the issue for the first time on appeal. 
Defendant's request for discovery must be put in context. The probable cause portion 
of the information stated that Ian Walston reported that he had a imprint of a shoe on his 
head, indicating that he had been kicked (R. 3-4). One week before trial, defense counsel 
filed a request for discovery (R. 102-107). The prosecutor complied with the request and, 
among other things, supplied the defense with multiple photographs of the victim's injuries 
(R213:42-43). Four of these photographs were designated as prosecution trial exhibits. See 
Exhibits 1-4. None, however, depicted a shoe print on the victim's head or face (R213: 42-
43). 
On the morning of trial, defense counsel raised the issue of the shoe print with the 
court. He explained that there was mention of a shoe print on the victim's face, but that none 
of the photographs provided to him depicted a shoe print (id.). Defense counsel explained 
that in one report there was reference to a red mark on defendant's face, but that the police 
found no substantiation that the red mark resulted from a kick (id.). 
The prosecutor agreed that the detective had investigated the allegation, but could find 
I 
no substantiation that the victim was kicked (id.). She also explained that she had no 
photograph depicting a shoe print and that no prosecution witness, including the victim, 
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would testify that the victim was kicked {id.). After this explanation, the trial court asked the 
prosecutor to verify that no evidence of a shoe print would be admitted by the State (id.). 
After the prosecutor agreed that no such evidence would be admitted, the court asked defense 
counsel if he had "[a]ny other concerns" (id.). Defense counsel responded by proceeding to 
another issue (id.). See Add. C. In context, defense counsel's response not only failed to 
articulate a discovery objection, it also implied that counsel was satisfied with the 
prosecutor's representation that the questioned photograph did not exist. 
Now, for the first time on appeal, defendant claims that the prosecutor improperly 
withheld the alleged exculpatory photograph. See Br.Aplt. at 19-23. In addition to not being 
preserved, the argument has no factual predicate. On either ground, it should be summarily 
rejected. 
To comply with Brady, "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable 
evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf. . . including the police." 
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). But a Brady violation "'occurs only where the 
state suppresses information that (1) remains unknown to the defense both before and 
throughout trial and (2) is material and exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would have 
created a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" 
State v.Finder, 2005 UT 15,\24,114P.3d 551 (quotingState v. Bisner, 2001 UT 994 333, 
37 P.3d 1073) (other internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On the other hand, a 
prosecutor has no duty to produce evidence that does not exist. Cf. Strickler v. Greene, 527 
24 
U.S. 263, 281-282 (1999); Pinder, 2005 UT 15, | 24 (both implying that the first prong of 
a Brady violation requires that the evidence exist). 
In this case, Ian subsequently explained at trial that the only reason he initially 
asserted that he had been kicked was because a nurse said it looked like he had been (R213: 
132-33,139). But Ian readily admitted that he did not know ifhe had been (i d). Debbieand 
Phyllis did not see anyone kick him. Furthermore, the prosecutor explained that the police 
investigated but could not substantiate that Ian was ever kicked (R213: 42-43). From these 
facts, defendant extrapolates that the trial court improperly found no discovery violation only 
because the prosecutor agreed not to introduce the evidence at trial. See Br.Aplt at 22. The 
record establishes, however, that the trial court never ruled on the issue because there was 
no factual basis to believe that the requested evidence existed (R213: 42-43). See Add. C. 
But even though the prosecution did not have the photograph, it provided the defense 
with the information that a nurse thought she observed a shoe print. In receiving this 
information, the defense was afforded the opportunity to call the nurse if they wished to 
support a theory that someone else caused the injuries. Strategically, the defense chose not 
to do so. Consequently, there is no Brady violation both because the requested photograph 
did not exist and also because the exculpatory information itself—that a nurse believed Ian 




UNDER UTAH'S CURE-OR-WAIVE RULE, DEFENDANT CANNOT 
CLAIM PREJUDICIAL ERROR BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
FAILED TO REMOVE TWO PROSPECTIVE JURORS FOR CAUSE 
WHERE THE TWO JURORS WERE PEREMPTORILY STRUCK AND 
THE SEATED JURY WAS IMPARTIAL 
Defendant argues that two prospective jurors (Kennedy and Johnson), should have 
been removed for cause because they were recent victims of similar crimes. See BrAplt. at 
24-26. At the same time, defendant acknowledges that he used the first two of four 
peremptory strikes to remove the challenged jurors. See id. See also R. 135 (Jury List). 
Defendant concedes that under Utah's well-established cure-or-waive rule, he can establish 
no prejudicial error because, once the two prospective jurors were stricken, the seated jury 
was impartial. See BrAplt. at 25. See also State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 505-507 (Utah 
1997); State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,398 (Utah 1994). Nevertheless, without analysis, he 
asks this Court to apply the cumulative error doctrine and reverse his conviction. See 
Br.Aplt. at 26. 
This Court should not consider the merits of the claim because defendant has not 
properly briefed the issue. "Those asking [an appellant court] to overturn prior precedent 
have a substantial burden of persuasion." Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398. Yet, here, defendant 
merely argues, "[T]he State will likely assert that the error in this instance was not 
prejudicial. Nonetheless, this Court can consider the cumulative error doctrine[.]" See 
BrAplt. at 26. This conclusory statement does not comply with rule 24fs analytical 
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requirements: defendant never explains "why" the Baker-Menzies cure-or-waive standard 
is not fully controlling or can be ignored. See Demetropoulos, 754 P.2d at 962. 
Even if the merits of defendant's claim are considered, the argument has no validity. 
Utah's cure-or-waive rule recognizes that a defendant must attempt to "cure" the alleged 
erroneous failure to remove a juror for cause or "be held to have 'waived' it." Baker, 935 
P.2dat505. 
Specifically, if the defendant had a peremptory challenge available, he or she 
would have to use it on the challenged juror. If the defendant did not use the 
peremptory, then the error would be deemed waived. Moreover, because 
Menzies held no ground for reversal exists unless a biased juror is actually 
retained on the panel, the issue would be preserved for appeal only if the 
number of jurors the trial court erroneously refused to dismiss for cause 
exceeded the number of peremptories available to the defendant. 
Id, Here, the number of challenged jurors did not exceed the number of peremptory strikes 
available to defendant and, therefore, no ground for reversal exists. 
Moreover, the cumulative error doctrine has nothing to do with preservation. Instead, 
the cumulative error doctrine applies only after a number of substantial errors have been 
found to exist. See Rammel, 721 P.2d at 501. Because the cumulative error doctrine focuses 
only on whether the combined effect of multiple errors justify reversal, it cannot be used to 
circumvent the Baker-Menzie preservation requirement or those cases' recognition that the 
compelled use of a peremptory strike does not constitute error unless a biased juror sat. 
In sum, defendant cannot claim prejudicial error here. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
This Court has discretion "to determine which matters require oral argument, which 
decisions require a full opinion, and which do not." Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, 
TI 16, 44 P.3d 734. Here, the decisional process would be significantly aided by oral 
argument. Cf. Utah R. App. P. 29(a). Therefore, the State requests oral argument. 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 4 0 3 . EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF 
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
RULE 608* EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF WITNESS 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a 
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or 
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful char-
acter is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has 
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a 
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for 
truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not 
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the 
court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthful-
ness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being 
cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does 
not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege against self-
incrimination when examined with respect to matters that relate only to 
character for truthfulness. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; November 1, 2004.] 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
RULE 24 . BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be 
set out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each 
issue: the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court; or 
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved 
in the trial court. 
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of 
this rule. 
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably para-
graphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in 
the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons 
of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and pails of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall 
state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award. 
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(a)(ll) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is 
necessary under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the 
brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is 
bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The adden-
dum shall contain a copy of: 
(a)(ll)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(a)(ll)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of 
Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the 
appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter 
service; and 
(a)(ll)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance 
to the determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the 
court's oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include; 
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatis-
fied with the statement of the appellant; or 
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the adden-
dum of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the 
appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief.' The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured 
person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursu-
ant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. 
If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in 
length. The brief of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the 
appellant and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file 
a brief which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appel-
lee/cross-appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in 
the appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's 
answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first brief. 
The lengths specified by this paragraph are exclusive of table of contents, table 
of authorities, and addenda. 
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the 
court for good cause shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that 
exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the 
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good 
cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before the • 
date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be 
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before 
the date the brief is due and seeking more than 5 additional pages shall be 
accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the 
motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of 
additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is 
granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court. 
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for the 
supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and 
shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
[Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; 
November 1, 1999; April 1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006.] 
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Addendum B 
1 A I personally did not witness any. 
2 Q So whatever somebody told, I defer to colleague 
3 today, would be hearsay evidence? In other words, you don't 
4 know that personally? 
5 A No, I don't but-
6 MR. PAYTON: I you've answered the question and I'd 
7 make a motion to strike Your Honor under Crawford v. 
8 Washington. 
9 THE COURT: She didn't answer. 
10 MR. PAYTON: She said no she didn't know that 
11 personally. 
12 THE COURT: Okay, I'll strike that. 
13 MR. PAYTON: And when I say stricken, I guess I 
14 should be clear for the record that all of her testimony about 
15 what other patrons told her at this juncture is clearly 
16 hearsay. 
17 MS. CAMERON: Your Honor, I think that-
18 THE COURT: No, no, just that last statement. 
19 Q (BY MR. PAYTON) You as general manager had a duty to 
20 insure the safety of all patrons, correct? 
21 A That's part of my responsibility. 
22 Q Anybody who appears to have too much to drink, your 
23 duty also includes asking them to leave? 
24 A Yes. 
25 I Q Did you feel you adequate security there that night? 
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1 A I did for the size of the crowd. 
2 Q Did the club terminate your employment shortly after 
3 this incident? 
4 A No, they did not. 
5 Q How much longer-
6 MS. CAMERON: Objection, Your Honor, (inaudible). 
7 THE COURT: Sustained. 
8 Q (BY MR. PAYTON) Mr. Walston has filed suit against 
9 your employer; is that correct? 
10 A No, he has not. 
11 Q He hasn't filed suit against Dimitri's or you don't 
12 know? 
13 A I don't know if he has or not. 
14 Q So your original statement, he has not, is not— 
15 A He has not to my knowledge but I do not know. 
16 Q Do you know if he's included in that suit? 
17 MS. CAMERON: Objection, asked and answered. 
18 THE COURT: Sustained. 
19 Q (BY MR. PAYTON) And you been contacted by civil 
20 counsel in connection with giving your deposition in the 
21 litigation? 
22 A No, I have not. 
23 Q So you know nothing about any civil lawsuit that Mr. 
24 Walston has filed? 
25 A No, I do not. 
1 Q And that's your testimony today under oath? 
2 A That's my testimony today under oath. 
3 Q Assuming with (inaudible) such a suit has in fact 
4 been filed, do you— 
5 MS. CAMERON: Objection, Your Honor, this is so far 
6 outside the scope of direct. It's entirely irrelevant. 
7 THE COURT: Sustained. 
8 Q (BY MR. PAYTON) You would logically be a witness in 
9 any litigation that has to do with this case? 
10 A I would be. 
11 MR. PAYTON: No further questions. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Payton. 
13 Redirect? 
14 MS. CAMERON: Thank you, Your Honor, very briefly. 
15 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
16 BY MS. CAMERON: 
17 Q Earlier Mr. Payton asked you about the interview you 
18 had with Detective Park. Do you recall what time of year that 
19 was? 
20 MR. PAYTON: Well, I have an objection and I guess 
21 it's out of confusion. If I don't get to talk about it, does 
22 the State get to talk about it? 
23 THE COURT: Overruled. 
24 THE WITNESS: I didn't understand the question. 
25 Q (BY MR. CAMERON) How far after the incident was your 
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the bar, couldn't you? 
A I don't remember. 
Q Would construe picking up a chair in a bar while 
intoxicated to be a threatening event to another person? 
A I don't know. 
Q How old are you? 
A Twenty-eight. 
Q How long have you been drinking? 
A Since I was of legal age. 
Q You spend a lot of time in bars? 
A No. 
Q Not at all? 
A No. I have, but not a whole great deal. 
Q You ever see people when the chairs come up off the 
floor, it's time to leave, right? 
A If I ever saw it, maybe. 
Q Anybody ever kick you repeatedly? 
A I don't know. 
Q Were you verbally attacked? 
A Yes. 
Q And is your contention that you at no time ever did 
anything to provoke an incident? 
A I never did. 
Q Never did. Have you been asked through legal counsel 
to discuss this incident? 
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1 A With who? 
2 Q With your lawyer that you hired, Steven B. Smith. 
3 You came to court with him, did you not? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q You retained Mr. smith— 
6 MS. CAMERON: Objection, Your Honor, irrelevant. 
7 MR. PAYTON: It is relevant. He's indicated he has 
8 no knowledge but he's retained a lawyer. 
9 THE COURT: Objection is sustained. 
10 Q (BY MR. PAYTON) When did you find out who the 
11 parties were in this case? 
12 A When I-
13 Q Excuse me, let me go back a minute. I'd like to 
14 insert for the record ^cause there's, under 404 there's what is 
15 called the attorney/client fraud privilege and there's also 
16 State of Utah v. Walker. In that case if the government knows 
17 - maybe they don't. 
18 MS. CAMERON: Your Honor, may we approach? This is 
19 not the time for legal argument. 
20 THE COURT: Certainly. 
21 MR. PAYTON: I'll at least will mark the record and 
22 ask for argument later. 
23 (Whereupon a sidebar was held) 
24 Q (BY MR. PAYTON) Have you read the witness statements 
25 I in this case? Hold on a minute. 
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longer exists and in fact the contrary does. You will now be 
required to speak together in reaching a unanimous verdict in 
this case. I will send with you in a moment the verdict forms, 
the original jury instructions and the four exhibits that have 
been admitted in this case. That's all you get along with your 
memory. Can't go over any other things, can't give you any 
more information. All the evidence you've heard is what you 
must use and only use for your deliberations. Tom cannot 
answer any questions and again, I cannot send more information; 
however, if you have any questions, I'll ask that you write 
them down and give them to Tom and I'll see if I can respond to 
them. With that, I will release you for your deliberations. 
(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
THE COURT: Let's just do a little cleanup work here. 
My understanding then is that the only exhibits that were 
admitted were State' 1, 2, 3 and 4; is that correct? 
MS. CAMERON: That is correct. 
THE COURT: Yeah, why don't you get those, give them 
to Lori. 
Mr. Payton, you said you wanted to make a couple of 
arguments? 
MR. PAYTON: Yes ma'am. 
THE COURT: Let's wait for a second for Ms. Cameron. 
All right. 
MR. PAYTON: Your Honor, first of all I have a 
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1 certified copy of a complaint of Ian Walston v. Kory Sullivan, 
2 Matthew Sullivan, (inaudible), Dimitri's, etc. The Court 
3 indicated it would not let me examine him with regards to bias 
4 or other matters. What I would like consistent with what the 
5 court both the Tenth Circuit has indicated and what our 
6 Appellate Courts have said, if there's an exhibit and there's 
7 an argument or not admitted to make a copy and put it in a 
8 sealed envelope and make it part of the file. I would ask if 
9 we could make a photocopy so we have a copy and I would like to 
10 submit the original in a sealed envelope consistent with that 
11 admonition and see what that - if I'm wrong in that lawsuit. 
12 My connection therewith and I appreciate that depending on the 
13 verdict may be moot, may be important as the case Ulden v. the 
14 State of Kentucky in which there was examination with regards 
15 to (inaudible) and other matters, the court cut counsel short. 
16 The United States Supreme Court said that in arguing a theory 
17 of the case, particularly if it goes to bias or motivation of a 
18 witness, that counsel should be given wide latitude. Ulden is 
19 one of those sleepers. It doesn't come up much unless you 
20 practice over in Federal Court where they give you all outdoors 
21 unless you're just way, way off the reservation and in this 
22 case, the fact that the statements, I would proffer to you, in 
23 his complaint in which Mr. Walston has asserted (inaudible) 
24 that he was kicked repeatedly, that is was unprovoked, that he 
25 J did nothing and I suggest to you in that connection that we 
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certainly had a right to examine him with regards to those 
I 
issues. 
I Under Rule 11, I think at the bench when in 
conference I indicated that counsel has - you can only carry 
advocacy so far but Ms, Khoury said she didn't know anything 
about a lawsuit being filed and yet she was the general manager 
and the various employers she described have been sued over 
this very incident. There is a case in this state. It's Willa 
Mae Walker v. State of Utah. I've been doing this too long 
when I can recite these things off the top of my head, but 
nonetheless, Ms. Walker initially in her appeal -
Are we out,of tape? 
THE COURT: No, we're fine. 
MR. PAYTON: I was going to say, the Supreme Court 
just came down saying if the record is missing, we get another 
shot at the whole trial. 
THE COURT: No, I think we've got five copies. 
MR. PAYTON: Willa Mae Walker was originally State v. 
Willa Mae Walker was convicted. It came back on a writ of 
(inaudible). Don't hear much of that. In fact there's only 27 
cases on the state of Utah. The Supreme Court took the unusual 
step of naming the prosecutor in that case by name. I spare it 
for the record here but they said where defense counsel was 
asserting a set of facts that the government knew or reasonably 
should have known were true, that for the government then to 
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1 try to argue to the jury or argue to the contrary, constituted 
2 a "fraud upon the court." The issue in that case was the 
3 officers had gone into a room, the defendant - it was in a 
4 hotel. Willa Mae Walker, I don't know if she's still alive but 
5 she was a well-known drug dealer down on 200 South and she 
6 said, listen, I didn't have sole occupancy of the room. When 
7 they went to execute the warrant and the gentleman was in the 
8 bed, they told him to get his clothes on and get out and then 
9 during the trial, the officers testified that, no, there was 
10 nobody else in the room. Later on, the writ was granted, they 
11 wouldn't let them retry her and as I indicated, in a scathing 
12 opinion where they named the prosecutor by name, they said you 
13 know, this was just flat out fraud. When you knew that the 
14 defendant's theory was correct, you couldn't just simply 
15 pretend under the guise of advocacy they couldn't do it. I'm 
16 simply saying here with no disparagement of my colleague, that 
17 that's what the case law is and the fact that this gentleman 
18 had filed a separate suit, particularly in light of the fact 
19 that the whole issue about the chair, that he didn't remember 
20 anything, and somebody who didn't even know him said he picked 
21 up a chair. 
22 I simply ask that we be allowed to make a photocopy 
23 and I'll submit the original in an envelope and I think that is 
24 a recent issue on appeal. 
25 I I indicated with regard to the jurors - and 
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This may very well come back. What we can do however is make a 
copy and preserve the certified copy of the complaint. 
THE COURT: Absolutely. Why don't you do that and 
date stamp it today. 
MR. PAYTON: I'd like to leave the original and just 
get a photocopy back. 
THE COURT: Or you can take the orginal, either way, 
that's fine. We'll put it in an envelope. 
Do you care to respond Ms. Cameron? 
MS. CAMERON: Your Honor, I would just simply state 
that I have no knowledge of the civil suit. I have heard 
rumors of a civil suit. I don't who it involved, who knows 
anything about it. It is not my arena, therefore I have stayed 
away from it. The name Steve Smith does come up because my 
office has been referred to him for our correspondence with Ian 
Walston, that is how I know him because he represents 
(inaudible). I don't know what that capacity is. 
As far as responding to Mr. Payton's motions, we 
received them - my office received them, I responded to them as 
quickly as possible. My understanding is the endorsement of 
the witnesses was the witnesses upon which the State relies 
(inaudible) being called as witnesses to testify and that is 
exactly what is included in the information. 
The date, time and place, I understand Mr. Payton is 
very interested in those. The date and place are clearly 
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1 listed on the information. The time is in the police reports 
2 and - is the Walker case? 
3 MR. PAYTON: Willa Mae Walker v. State of Utah. 
4 MS. CAMERON: The juvenile court case with the-
5 MR. PAYTON: That had to do with the - if you know 
6 the time and date, just tell them what the time and date is 
7 specifically. 
8 MS. CAMERON: I'm specifically referring to the on or 
9 about meaning a problem with that case was entirely different 
10 and it was actually an element of defense as to the age of the 
11 victim, I think, in that offense and therefore that whole logic 
12 does not apply to this case. 
13 MR. PAYTON: One short challenge. The only thing 
14 that bothers us now for the first time we know that the 
15 1 government was directed to correspond with Steven Smith in all 
16 matters about this who happens to be the attorney that has 
17 filed a civil suit on behalf of Mr. Walston. When I asked him 
18 if I attempted to interview him through his attorney and that's 
19 where I got cut off, that I couldn't talk about any other 
20 litigation. This is the first time the government has 
21 indicated that they were directed to correspond with Mr. Smith. 
22 THE COURT: I don't believe that's what you stated 
23 Ms. Cameron, was it? 
24 MR. PAYTON: (inaudible) record, but -
25 I THE COURT: You said that in order to get to the 
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1 defendant,* that was the address, correct? 
2 MS. CAMERON: No, to get with - Ian Walston has 
3 directed all correspondence, written correspondence - I've 
4 communicated with him on the phone and have contacted him. 
5 I've had my investigator contact him in person but the phone 
6 number that I have had in order to placed calls to him, I have 
7 Ian Walston's phone number and I had Steve Smith's phone number 
8 and those are the two that I use. So, I am aware that Steve 
9 Smith was involved with Ian Walston for some reason but I 
10 actually had never been introduced to him. 
11 THE COURT: With regard to the matters with regards 
12 to last week's filings, I find no defects in any of the 
13 procedure or disclosures that the State has given. 
14 With regard to the issue of the use of the complaint 
15 in the civil proceeding, I found that it was irrelevant, also 
16 that the precisely the same information was previously - the 
17 defendant previously was cross examined on the precise issues. 
18 I found it to be not only irrelevant but cumulative. That's 
19 about it. I think I've ruled sufficiently from the bench. 
20 MR. PAYTON: Did I talk about the breach before? I 
21 think I did. I said in the State v. (inaudible) at the bench 
22 and you said I could reserve that. I said the case law says a 
23 defendant can introduce a police report if he wishes verbatim. 
24 The prosecution cannot - if both parties stipulate it comes in 




1 questioning with Ms. Johnson and she indicated that she could 
2 serve, she believed she could serve as an impartial juror in 
3 this case. 
4 I think there's one more, Mr. Payton. 
5 MR. PAYTON: We have abandoned any challenge in that 
6 regard. 
7 THE COURT: All right. There was another matter you 
8 wish to raise then? 
9 MR. PAYTON: Yes ma'am. Prior to the jury coming in 
10 we asked the clerk if we could have the benefit of the record 
11 before they were sworn so that jeopardy would not attach. The 
12 defense in this case, pursuant to our request, was provided 
13 with discovery materials; however mentioned therein is a 
14 videotape of an interview and a audio tape and they call it 
15 photograph of the victim. There is much discussion in the 
16 discovery matters about a shoe print on his face; however, I 
17 don't think that anybody contends, nor did the detective in 
18 this case contend that any shoe print on his face was caused by 
19 my client. But we have never seen that photograph, it was not 
20 provided to us but we wanted to make clear that— 
21 THE COURT: Are you submitting any such photograph? 
22 MS. CAMERON: Your Honor, I don't have a photograph 
23 of a shoe print on anyone's face. I provided - I asked for all 
24 the photographs from our office in this case to be provided to 
25 Mr. Payton. If he has not seen them all then I do have copies 
1 of them and some enlargements. There are four that I do intend 
2 to-
3 THE COURT: But the issue, Mr. Payton-
4 MS. CAMERON: I have no foot print. 
5 THE COURT: —need not be concerned? You're not 
6 intending to use any such thing. 
7 MS. CAMERON: No. 
8 THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Payton, in addition to that 
9 photograph? 
10 MR. PAYTON: Let me be clear, Detective Park in his 
11 interview, in one of the interviews acknowledged that there was 
12 a photograph that showed a red mark on the victim's face but 
13 Detective Park also indicated in his interview with various 
14 persons here that he could find nobody to substantiate that 
15 anybody had stepped on or put a footprint on this person's 
16 face. 
17 THE COURT: The State had indicated they're not 
18 submitting any evidence with regard to a footprint on a face. 
19 Did I miss that, Ms. Cameron? 
20 MS. CAMERON: No Your Honor, the State is not 
21 intending to admit any evidence about a footprint on anybody's 
22 face. 
23 THE COURT: Any other concerns? 
24 MR. PAYTON: The other issue was, there's a reference 
25 J to a videotape and I don't know we weren't provided with one of 
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1 the interviews with the victim's sister. In the report that 
2 was prepared it did and does indicate that Detective Park, on 
3 March 31st, 2003, he met with Crystal which is the victim's 
4 sister and did an audio and videotape interview with her. We 
5 were not provided with that. I do not know why but I did not. 
6 Under normal circumstances I would for a continuance 
7 (inaudible) but I don't know why we were not provided with it 
8 since under Clayson, Utah County, where they a substituted 
9 public defendant, they say that we have a duty not only to 
10 identify with the interests of our client but to be diligent 
11 and quick frankly against hostility oftentimes, plow forward. 
12 They haven't indicated that Ms. Walston is a witness today but 
13 certainly we were entitled to see a videotape. 
14 MS. CAMERON: Your Honor, if I might? 
15 THE COURT: Sure. 
16 MS. CAMERON: My office received Mr. Payton's request 
17 for a videotape, audio tapes and all other types of discovery 
18 evidence on the 5th of January which was last Wednesday. I'm 
19 sure my office acted with all due diligence in copying those. 
20 They might possible in the mail and being sent to him. I do 
21 not have them. I've not been aware of them. I have 
22 transcripts of those interviews which I have provided to Mr. 
23 Payton. 
24 MR. PAYTON: And let me simply indicate that with 
25 [ regards to the few motions that I've filed that counsel did 
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1 approach me and said they sent it to an old address but they 
2 wanted to make sure I got them. Now we're saying well it might 
3 be in the mail but— 
4 MS. CAMERON: Actually, Your Honor, it was the jury 
5 instructions that were sent to the old address and it is my 
6 understanding that Mr. Payton contacted our office and asked to 
7 have the materials ready for him and he picked them up by 
8 courier at some point in time. I don't know if the videotapes 
9 were included or not. 
10 MR. PAYTON: The videotapes were not and that's 
11 correct, I did indicate we would pick it up by courier and we 
12 did pick it up by courier. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. Let me reflect what I see in the 
14 record. Mr. Payton, you first appeared on this case in court 
15 with Judge McCleve on the 25th of September 2003. You filed an 
16 appearance of counsel in this case on the 8th of March 2004. I 
17 don't see any request for a discovery. You did file a motion 
18 with this court at the end of last week. This is the second 
19 time this matter has been set for jury. First time it was set 
20 on the 20th of September of this year for an October setting. 
21 It's inconceivable to me really that a request for discovery 
22 comes in four days before trial and you've been involved in 
23 this case for about 16 months. 
24 MR. PAYTON: I need to be clear that, number one, 
25 I there's no contingent by the State that it's not timely and 
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1 meets the rule, and number two, there is discovery filed in 
2 this case; and number three, as long as I'm within the rule I 
3 don't think can get beat up and I did indicate to the Court the 
4 first time it came up that I wanted a 6-week delay for medical 
5 reasons and the Court expressed its own medical history that 
6 sometimes you're in incredible pain and I indicated that in six 
7 weeks I expect to be released by the orthopedic surgeon and I 
8 represented that I take physical therapy twice a week and anti-
9 inflammatories because my lefthand was crushed in an accident. 
10 Now, when this came up we were a third place setting, 
11 two people were in jail. I understand one of those was 
12 continued because the legal defendant had too many people in 
13 jail and had to try another case. So I think if I'm being beat 
14 up and as a claim of due diligence, I'd simply offer that I was 
15 within the rule. 
16 THE COURT: I'm not claiming one thing or another. 
17 You're claiming things, Mr. Payton, and your case, this is the 
18 second time - you chose to go to trial. This is the second 
19 time we've had a trial setting. You are the first person in 
20 line for this trial setting, period. That's the way it works. 
21 MR. PAYTON: I don't have a problem. I think the 
22 issue was the videotape and the government had indicated 
23 they've put it in the mail. 
24 THE COURT: All right, anything further Mr. Payton? 
25 I MR. PAYTON: No, ma'am. 
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1 light, that's what you testified to? 
2 A Yeah, he gave me a little... 
3 Q I'll let you finish that answer because you just 
4 said, "Yeah he gave me" and I'm used to complete sentences. 
5 I'm sorry. 
6 A It was just a little flash of light. 
7 Q Did he head butt you? 
8 A I'm sorry? 
9 Q Did Mr. Matthew Sullivan head butt you? 
10 A No. 
11 Q Do you know a gentleman named (inaudible)? 
12 A No. 
13 Q But no question in your mind, Matthew Sullivan was 
14 the one who initiated this incident? 
15 A That's correct. 
16 Q Did you indicate that there were other persons who 
17 struck? 
18 A I'm sorry, can you repeat that? 
19 Q Did you ever at any time indicate there were other 
20 persons who struck you? 
21 A No. 
22 Q Did you ever indicate that there were shoe prints on 
23 your face? 
24 A Yes. 
25 J Q In fact, there were no shoe prints on your face were 
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1 there? 
2 A From what the nurses told me was that there was. 
3 Q But the fact of the matter is, there were no shoe 
4 prints on your face were there? 
5 A I can't answer that question. I didn't have a mirror 
6 at the time. 
7 Q Talking to Detective Park did you indicate as many as 
8 three people may have assaulted you? 
9 A That's correct. 
10 Q When I just asked you, you amended that there was at 
11 least three people who struck you. Do you recall indicating 
12 that Matthew Sullivan was the person who did the most damage to 
13 you? 
14 A No. 
15 MR. PAYTON: May I approach? 
16 THE COURT: Yes. 
17 Q (BY MR. PAYTON) I have again marked a box. I'd ask 
18 that you read the items in that box to yourself and when you've 
19 completed that, signal me that you are through and then I shall 
20 question you about a statement attributable to you. 
21 I'm sorry, are you through? 
22 A Yes. 
23 Q Did you see the statement that's attributable there 
24 to you? 
25 I A I do see that, yes. 
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